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Abstract 
This paper gives a comprehensive account on the general tendencies of the study of 
corporatism throughout the last forty years (1970-2010). After a brief introduction that 
explains the basic features of the literature subject to this survey, we proceed with analysis 
at two different levels. We begin by labeling 630 articles according to five broad categories 
for a wide-scope view of the study of corporatism. The subsequent stage comprehends 315 
articles sampled from three leading journals where each article was coded for 23 fields of 
inquiry. At this second stage we discuss the general perceived tendencies in theoretical 
construction and deployment, in the evolution of statistical data and techniques, the 
geographical coverage of empirical studies, and the changing nature of the concept. We then 
discuss the global meaning of this literature and point out the reasons for its changing but 
lasting relevance in political science studies. 
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Este artigo fornece descrição exaustiva do estudo do corporativismo nos últimos quarenta 
anos (1970-2010). Após uma breve introdução sobre as características centrais da literatura 
em em questão procedemos a uma análise mais detalhada a em duas fases. A primeira fase 
conta com uma classificação de 630 artigos de acordo com cinco categorias de modo a 
permitir uma leitura geral do estudo do corporativismo. A fase subsequente de análise 
compreende 315 artigos recolhidos de três revistas académicas de destaque em que cada 
artigo foi codificado em 23 campos. Nesta fase são examinadas a dinâmica da construção 
teórica e seus usos, a evolução de técnicas e dados estatísticos, a cobertura geográfica dos 
estudos empíricos, e a natureza cambiante do conceito. Terminamos com uma discussão do 
significado global desta literatura apntando as razões para a sua relevância oscilante mas 
permanente no contexto da ciência política. 
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In 1974 Philippe Schmitter contributed, with an acclaimed and widely read paper, to 
re-launching in modern terms the debate on the meaning and relevance of 
corporatism for political science studies (Schmitter, 1974).  Almost forty years later, 
the prudent doubt given to the title of that seminal article could just as well be the 
motto for the present analysis: was it indeed the twentieth century “still the century 
of corporatism”? This article, however, asks instead: how long did “the century of 
corporatism” last in the scientific research realm, how has it evolved, and why has it 
declined? 
 In this paper we present an analysis of new data pertaining to the late history 
of the concept as a field of academic interest from 1970 to 2010. Arguably, what 
corporatism is or should be has never been settled despite its long existence as 
subject of inquiry. This state of affairs has not impeded, however, burgeoning 
research heralding its effects and causes, continuous theoretical work on its essential 
features, and countless analytical sub-categories. While it is still a contentious 
concept it appears to have moved away, in the last decade, from the centre of 
academic concerns in political science. New vocabulary has been mobilized to 
address the issues that were once in the corporatist turf, much like corporatism came 
to dispute previous pluralist empirical grounds. A large share of this new vocabulary 
falls under the literature of the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and it 
has, along with studies on corporatism, contributed to shape the ever more distinct 
field of political economy. But corporatism’s relevance and need of examination did 
not remain confined within this field. Due to its complexity and ductility the concept 
raised important questions pertaining to state theory, democratic theory and, 
consequently, to studies of political behaviour and public policy. 
 One of the challenges of the analysis conducted was to delimit the concept of 
corporatism so that its use could be treated in a quantitative fashion, and 
simultaneously honour its plastic and ubiquitous quality. While it would be 
interesting to trace how corporatism made its way through all these sub-fields of 
inquiry, what seemed more compelling to understand was its decreasing presence, 
and this would be a manifold story, creating pretext for many literature reviews. To 
choose was imperative and the bias in this paper follows that of the literature — as 
confirmed by the data — towards economic issues. Therefore, we present an outlook 
of how, in the more orthodox approaches of political economy, the concern with 
corporatism was progressively diluted. 
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 In the first section an overview of the study of corporatism in the macro-
economic polity is offered, trying to present the different interpretations and 
meanings of the concept. Next, we proceed to a description of the methods and data 
of the analysis followed by the presentation of the results. Analysis takes place at two 
different levels. We begin by labeling 630 articles according to five broad categories 
for a wide-scope view of the study of corporatism (categories described in appendix 
1). The subsequent stage comprehends 315 articles sampled from three leading 
journals where each article was coded for 23 fields of inquiry (described in appendix 
2). For the data analysis of articles covered the paper develops Munck and Snyder’s 
(2007) study applied to comparative politics. Finally, the last section presents a 
discussion on what our results suggest about the relationship between the study of 
corporatism, the academic community and the shifting material realities ascribable to 
the concept. We then conclude by discussing the global meaning of this literature, 
pointing out the reasons for its changing but lasting relevance in political science 
studies. 
 
Setting the scene: interpretations and definitions 
Schmitter’s interrogation referred to above — “still the century of corporatism?” — 
was itself a pretext to address the claim put forward by Mihail Manoilesco in one of 
the most remarkable books on economic, social and political corporatism published 
during the interwar period (Manoilesco, 1934). That time still held the belief of a 
perennial system that could be the watermark of the twentieth century. For the most 
part Manoilesco’s ambitious vision did not materialize, though his reflections did 
provide grounds for legitimating an alternative social system to both capitalism and 
socialism. Schmitter’s own reading of Manoilesco’s work, while seeking to 
reinvigorate its latent reformist ambition with renewed doctrinal guidance for 
processes of social transformation, did not restore the corporatist coinage that would 
presumably characterize it. But it did transform corporatism in one of the quasi-
compulsory subject matters of political science for the last forty years. 
 Schmitter has heavily influenced most of the conceptual systematization for 
the manifold modalities of corporatism. This indebtedness regards especially the 
rehabilitation of an idea for which previous corporatist experiments of authoritarian 
fascist-like political regimes contributed in a very negative way by damaging a 
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concept that would otherwise be a useful analytical tool for capturing and 
understanding significantly distinct historical realities.1 
 Through Schmitter’s perspective, corporatism could be rescued from the 
reputation to which it had been cast both as an analytical tool for polity matters and 
as an historical experiment of socio-economic organization.2 The keys to refurbishing 
corporatism and guaranteeing axiological distance from the stigma that the quasi-
original sin of totalitarian ideologies had built laid on its remote historical origins, its 
linkages with organicist and solidarist traditions, and social Catholicism. From this 
line of reasoning, present in the works of Schmitter, Wiarda and others, followed the 
growing acceptance of the designation of democratic corporatism in contemporary 
political literature,3 an expression that could adequately address the phenomena of 
interest representation and the interplay between popular demands, reciprocity 
compensations and state support taking place in advanced societies throughout the 
last decades of the twentieth century. As Schmitter synthesized: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands of 
supports (Schmitter, 1974, p. 13). 
The 1980’s showed a widespread usage of the term corporatism to describe a 
landscape of interest intermediation, thus providing an alternative to the 
conventional focus on organized interests mediated through a competitive electoral 
process between rival parties (cf. Williamson, 1989). This translated in a building 
momentum around the belief that besides classical mechanisms of political 
representation in advanced democracies there were forms of organization and 
representation beyond the sheer logic of political markets: 
Corporatist authors are not only concerned with the representative, democratic 
implications of group politics. They also devote considerable attention to the role that 
corporatism can play in ensuring the maintenance of political stability, or 
governability, in liberal democracies and in improving the effectiveness of 
interventionist policies (Williamson, 1989, p. 3). 
Besides representation, interests came to be conceived as also subject to 
intermediation and regulation, a significant analytical shift in all that pertained to the 
                                                        
1 On the importance of Schmitter’s oeuvre in the redefinition of the research agenda for corporatism, see 
the ensemble of works dedicated to him and collected in cf. Crouch and Streeck (2006).  
2 Identical position found in Wiarda (1974) who firmly rejects the idea of a bounded association of 
corporatism to fascism or any other reactionary and backward-looking ideology. 
3 Cf. Panitch (1979) Newman (1981) and Schmitter (1984); for an integrated overview of modern 
interpretations of corporatism and neocorporatism cf. Pryor (1988). 
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matters of pacts among social partners and collective wage setting and bargaining 
arrangements. Thus, speaking of corporatism implies the conceptual apparatus of a 
mediated exchange between state and civil society as the framework for the overall 
definition and implementation of public policies (cf. Cawson, 1985). 
Corporatism is a distinct conceptualization of the relationship between the modern 
state and society. Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which 
organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political 
exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which involves those 
organizations in a role that combines interest representation and policy 
implementation through delegated self-enforcement (Cawson, 1985, p. 8). 
The matter is especially relevant if looked through the perspective of traditional 
actors participating in social concertation – government, trade unions and business 
associations – in search of wage setting agreements, the making of labor laws, and of 
establishing incentive policies directed towards specific sectors of economic activity 
(cf. Goldthorpe, 1984). 
As far as partnership practices and social collaboration are concerned, 
corporatism in democratic regimes corresponds to voluntary and informal 
coordinating procedures of conflicting objectives through the enactment of 
succeeding and continual bargaining instruments in which an ensemble of interest 
groups, political parties, state representatives and regulatory agencies, to sum up, a 
variety of agents and institutions, comes to grant flexibility to the processes of 
decision-making hence helping to create a stable political climate.4 
The matter of whether this political toolbox is economically efficient is certainly 
relevant, thus begging to point out the successful cases where economic growth met a 
favorable political environment (see Malloy, 1974; Katzenstein, 1987) fostered by the 
diffusion of corporatism as an ideology with an ethical content that advocates the 
harmony of interests and greater equity in social distribution of resources. 
Overall, discussing the potential of corporatism as an effective system of 
interest organization and rent distribution unavoidably joins with the question of 
determining the type of political regime most favorable to economic growth. 
Accordingly, stemming from the assumption that institutional variability among 
advanced capitalist economies is a relevant explanatory feature, research conceived 
to account for the levels of economic performance based on the nature of systems of 
interest articulation and intermediation has gained renewed consideration. By 
acknowledging the significance of the social regulation dimension as an intervening 
                                                        
4 On the topic of organized interests and their relevance in contemporary political systems’ design cf. 
Streeck (2006).  
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factor upon supply of goods and services this institutionalist approach is particularly 
important as regards the sphere of production. In this light, the artificial opposition 
between market rational behavior, allegedly sensitive to economic stimulus alone, 
and the role of social institutions seeking the optimal allocation of the resources 
mobilized through market forces (Streeck, 1992) lost much of its analytical purchase. 
Thelen’s (1994) review of the study of corporatism stresses this very same point: the 
interests of both employers and workers came to be portrayed in a much more 
intricate complexion once the analytical emphasis accompanied the real policy shift 
from demand side to supply side management. The Keynesian perspective of the 
worker as a consumer met an equal attention to the role of the labor unions as the 
“organized representatives of workers as producers” (Thelen, 1994, p. 118). 
Concomitantly, the stylized depiction of the employers, as agents moved by a desire 
for greater flexibility of the labor market, developed into an account that highlighted 
their support for extra-market institutional arrangements to provide for collective 
goods that prove valuable for competing in the international marketplace. 
It is still in this context that we may frame the vast literature on the varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and types of democracy (Schmitter and Todor, 
2009), or on the diversity of economic systems in a globalized world (Amable, 2005). 
It goes without saying that these approaches have launched or pursued different 
paths of research. Nevertheless, though clearly differentiated from pure corporatist 
literature in their assumptions and objectives, these new lines of research offer fresh 
statements about decision making processes, the implementation of public policies, 
the embedding of functional relations between economic and political spheres, the 
regulation procedures and governance strategies, be them at the micro-corporate or 
macro-state tiers. They also provide relevant comparisons that are not limited to 
cross-national cases and are rather extensive to the particularities of economic 
sectors taken at an international comparative scale (Hollingsworth, Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1994). 
All these approaches converge and coincide in the relevance attributed to 
proceeding through an analysis of comparative institutional advantage. This modus 
operandi is usually followed through with the elaboration of empirical studies on the 
degrees of corporatism (degree of unionization; strike frequency; representativeness 
of business associations; degree of centralization in wage bargaining and setting; 
actual participation in political decision making; extension of state economic sectors; 
degree of welfarism, etc.) able to produce measures of corporatization similar to 
 7
those built for the purpose of analyzing phenomena such as corruption and quality of 
democracy (cf. Pryor, 1988 and Siaroff, 1999). 
Another concern within this kind of studies is the evaluation and comparison of 
incentive systems and administrative obstacles and hindrances interfering both in 
collective decision-making and individual choice, and in fostering behaviors ranging 
from cooperation to rivalry with clear implications for the unraveling of collective 
action. 
The discussion around the presence of corporatist elements in contemporary 
economic organization is acknowledged by the authors that resort to typologies of 
differentiation between modalities of capitalist economies, whether in the more 
simplified version dichotomized between pure liberal capitalism of an American type 
and the German type of corporatism (Phelps, 2009), the distinction of liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or the more 
sophisticated version that enlightens this distinction through geographical 
specificities that result from cultural and institutional complementarities 
differentiating the European continental model, the Mediterranean model, and the 
Asian model (Amable, 2005). 
A basic set of common attributes pervades these different approaches to 
modern corporatism, namely: the detailed study of the institutions directly related 
with the functioning of markets; the definition of rules of fair competition and the 
awareness of the consequences of their non obedience; the analysis of wage relations 
and the functioning of the labor market; the mode of organization of the sectors of 
financial intermediation and the prevailing models of management and corporate 
governance; the setting up of welfare and educational systems; and the depiction of 
the political regimes and party systems. In other words, this is all about 
acknowledging the relevance of the impact that an ample set of institutional features 
bears on the attainment of specific levels of economic performance and growth. It is 
also about acknowledging how the sustainability of economic growth depends upon 
the interconnection, cooperation and networking among partners, and does therefore 
benefit from conflicting tensions between social groups. Summing up, it is herein 
perceived a certain rehabilitation of the same guiding principles professed by inter-
war corporatist ideologues, hence demonstrating the validity and helpfulness of the 
concept of corporatism for the understanding of socio-economic dynamics across 
political regimes of a quite distinct nature.  
The diverse but interweaving themes synthetically presented above are 
approached and/or analyzed in the series of articles sampled for this study. 
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Throughout the four decades under scrutiny it is possible to discern evolutionary 
tendencies in the theoretical and empirical treatment of these matters, to explain the 
relevance they assume in particular conjunctures, or to elucidate the emergence and 
development of certain topics in terms of their political opportunity. 
 While the semantic flux contained in the term corporatism, because 
constitutive and constituted by the reality of the political and social worlds, plays a 
crucial role in the recurring interest and analyses of the concept, for the present 
purposes it had to be somehow domesticated and neatly arranged. 
 The attempt to devise an organizing principle for the seemingly unlimited 
possibility of species belonging to the corporatist genus steered us, with hindsight in 
a rather logical way, to the modern formulation of the concept before the burgeoning 
specification of sub-types was ignited. Manoilescu’s take on the concept is especially 
useful because it builds on, albeit in an interweaving fashion, the two general shapes 
in which it may be conceived: an intellectual product of ideology and doctrine; and an 
actualized principle of socio-political organization that is possible regardless of any 
prior or simultaneous theorization.5 Perhaps the fittest recent example of this 
independence between doctrine and practice are the post-Mao Chinese regulatory 
experiments for market liberalization. While the rhetoric contained in the doctrine of 
corporatism is simply incommensurable with the preceding monist character of the 
Chinese state, ultimately in charge of its own reform, the processes of economic 
renovation have been grounded on what are described as local state corporatism (Oi, 
1992; Maria, 2004) and socialist corporatism (Pearson, 1994) systems of interest 
interaction. Noteworthy is too how this example, by suggesting how corporatism may 
constitute a passing way from monolithic communism towards economic liberalism 
as much as a way out of the latter like the early theorizing of the 20th century longed 
for, discourages an explanation of it as a third way solution between capitalism and 
communism. 
 This distinction between ideology and doctrine is in Manoilescu far from clear 
due to its utopian aspirations which in turn furthers the delicacy and fluidity of the 
inherent balance of public and private articulation contained within the concept. 
With this in mind we may wonder if the classical definition put forth by Schmitter 
would have sufficed. It probably would have, but with different results. Schmitter’s 
definition only gestured at corporatism’s core. When all that is accessory is peeled off 
and its essential contradictory nature bulges we are left with: the institutionalization 
                                                        
5 And even then did Manoilescu conceive two sub-types: the corporatisme pur and the corporatism 
subbordonné. 
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of the normative distinction between private and public interest and the subsequent 
functional articulation of both. The remaining features present in the classical 
definition provided by Schmitter offered the relevant dimensions for a par genus et 
differentiae empirical analysis of actually existing corporatism. What our lean and 
broad definition of corporatism lent us was the ability to acknowledge the existence 
of corporatist patterns in any field of functional representation with participation in, 
and at any stage of, state intervention, and also the very corporatist-specific modality 
of self-regulated procedural regulation, i.e. a social order guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity.6 So, after the sample of articles had been collected what was to be 
determined for each of the articles was the matter of whether they effectively dealt 
with the issues pertaining to the performance, by private associations, of classically 
conceived public duties, tasks and activities and “delegated self-enforcement” 
(Cawson, 1985, p. 8). 
  
Data and Methods 
Given the goal of making sense of the wide literature on the concept and phenomena 
signaled by the term corporatism one would need a ductile, overarching definition to 
start with, even if minimal, and then proceed by an always arbitrary reduction of the 
universe taken under scrutiny. The problem of starting with a priori definitions of 
what is to be observed is the irrevocable bias thereof. This bias was avoided in the 
first sampling phase by adopting criteria exterior to the controversy — if the article 
mentioned the terms “corporatism”, “tripartite arrangements”, “social pacts”, and 
“wage bargaining”, and was relevant to anyone who wished to learn more about 
corporatism, it was taken as a positive sample and ready to be labeled. In the second 
stage however an analysis more attuned to the concrete understanding of 
corporatism as presented above was enacted.  
 The data is thence consisting of two separate sets. Data Set 1 labels 630 
articles referring to corporatism in the text from nine journals: American Journal of 
Sociology (43 articles); British Journal of Political Science (55 articles); 
Comparative Political Studies (109 articles); Comparative Politics (115 articles); 
International Organization (64 articles); Political Studies (115 articles); Politics and 
Society (48 articles); Social Forces (21 articles); Studies in Comparative 
International Development (60 articles). These journals were selected according to 
                                                        
6 The concept of private interest government (see Streek and Schmitter, 1985, pp. 1-29), arguably to a 
great extent a development of this catholic principle social organization, best fits the role of an ideo-
typical formulation of this kind of regulation. 
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straightforward criteria of highest number of relevant articles gathered on random 
sampling. Each journal was then browsed for the period from 1970 to June 20117 
through their respective search engine for the term “corporatism”. All types of 
articles such as research notes, rejoinders and debates, articles on methodology, and 
introductions to special issues were included except for book and literature reviews. 
With the exception of the sociologically leaning journals (Social Forces and American 
Journal of Sociology) the number of articles referring to corporatism represents 
approximately a little less than 10% of the total amount of published articles in the 
remaining seven journals and there is no significant fluctuation in the number of 
published articles within these journals throughout the four decades. 
 Based on the results of the preceding, for Data Set 2 we took 315 articles 
coded for 23 variables from the three journals that displayed the largest amount of 
articles thus promising a representative assortment.8 The journals are: Comparative 
Politics, Comparative Political Studies, and Political Studies. These 315 represent 
approximately 10% of the total amount of published articles in these three journals. 
The design of the coding fields for stage two relied largely on Munck and 
Snyder’s (2007) enterprise for analyzing the nature of research on comparative 
politics, with some adaptations made for two reasons. The first and more relevant 
was the need to render the data amenable for engagement with, and assessment of, 
some claims on the evolution of scholarly attention to political economy issues. Of 
particular note here is Schmidt’s (2008) depiction of the changing analytical focus 
between labour, the state, and business9, and Kenworthy’s (2000) account of a shift 
from an interest in corporatism per se to corporatism’s effects and his claim that, 
after some disinterest, corporatism came “back in the limelight” in the early 1990’s 
because of a resurgence in political practice of corporatist pacts.  
Secondly, in reading Munck and Snyder’s analysis of leading journals, all 
fields appear to serve a clear purpose and to be unproblematic, especially because 
presented with already treated information where everything seems tidied up and put 
to its proper place. However when trying to replicate the coding fields some issues of 
reliability appeared insurmountable like, for instance, the matter of whether the 
                                                        
7 Both the fact that the British Journal of Political Science is only available from 1971 onward, and the 
fact that the survey only covers half of 2011 have some weight on the results. 
8 See appendix 2 for a list of fields and variables covered.  
9 Schmidt depicts five shifts in scholarly attention from the 1970’s to present: 1) an early focus on labour, 
the structure and power of unions in macroeconomic policies in the 1970’s; 2) a turn to an emphasis on 
the state in the 1980’s (recognized under the umbrella term of “bringing the state back in”); 3) a 
subsequent denial of state centrality by the early 1990’s; 4) the rising of firm-centered analysis thrust by 
the “varieties of capitalism school”; 5) and a slow rise of redirected attention towards labour and 
corporatist types of policies. 
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article offers descriptions or causal accounts. No matter how precise the question, the 
answer offered in the article is unlikely to be so. Additionally, some variables were 
left out because of lack of import for the present purposes10.  
Among other specificities the variables chosen aim to gauge: the substantive 
scope and the spatial and temporal range of analysis; the types of corporatism dealt 
with; data generation; and methods of theory construction and empirical analysis. 
The most problematic field of coding was unsurprisingly whether the main theme of 
the article was corporatism or not. 
Some issues of reliability are naturally present in the kind of coding 
conducted. Even an apparently readily applicable broad definition of corporatism 
seems at odds with precise objective reasoning, and the exposure to manifold notions 
of corporatism tends to shape the succeeding readings of the initial definition. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that if the sample was re-coded there 
would be any significant changes in the general patterns that have emerged, which 
are ultimately the main point of interest of this type of handling with large bulks of 
subjective information.  
 
Results 
Data Set 1 
The main purpose of the first stage of analysis is to provide a broad account of the 
evolving scholarly interest on the subject of corporatism throughout time and the 
ways it was dealt with and approached. From the nine journals selected,11 the 
sampled articles were labeled once according to one of the five categories:12 Regimes 
and Institutions (RI); Indicators, Measures and Models (IMM); Economic 
Performance (EP); Theory, Foundations and Currents of Thought (TFC); and 
Historical Examples (HE). As mentioned above this sample is composed of a majority 
of scientific articles but notes, replies, rejoinders, and debates were also gathered; the 
total number of documents is 630.  
The distribution per category displays the predominance of RI, followed by 
                                                        
10 These were: gender of authors; type of institutions with which author is affiliated; author’s rank;  
funding for the research; presence of formal data sets in data analysis; and existence of non-English 
sources. 
11 Journals were selected according to straightforward criteria of highest number of articles gathered on 
random sampling: American Journal of Sociology; British Journal of Political Science; Comparative 
Political Studies; Comparative Politics; International Organization; Political Studies; Politics and 
Society; Social Forces; Studies in Comparative International Development. 
12 Naturally these categories while analytically distinct overlap to some degree, the criteria for 
determining labels can be consulted in appendix 1. 
 
IMM, TFC, EP, and HE respectively [see fig. 1]. This layout represents both the 
labeling criteria and the actual focus of research. The predominance of the RI 
category is largely attributable to the generic characteristics of the concept of 
corporatism embodying the relationship of a certain type of institutions within a 
political regime, so we may view this category as the default label, i.e. it contains the 
articles which did not rightfully belong to any other category. 
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The total number of sampled articles rises steadily until the early 1990’s and starts 
afterwards to decrease monotonically, reaching, in the final period (20
approximately two thirds of the amount at its apex (1991
rise in the number of articles mentioning corporatist themes follows the general 
increase of published research in social science, its decrease is more likely 
real shift in overall perceived relevance of the subject and its explanatory power. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the weight decrease initiated in the early 1990’s 
corresponds to both the occurrence of a period of stable economic performance and
the development of new social and political coordination mechanisms, especially 
within the framework of European institutional settings, and, ultimately mitigating 
the demand for more typically corporatist solutions of bargaining and representation.
Perhaps the pattern that best illustrates scholarly attention on the subject of 
corporatism is the evolution of the number of articles labeled IMM. Starting with 
comparatively low numbers when juxtaposed with TFC, from the early 1990’s onward 
the IMM category surpass largely TFC numbers and does not decrease with the same 
pace as the other categories [see fig. 3].
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Data Set 2 
For Data Set 2 the first task was to determine whether the article actually focused on 
corporatism or dealt with corporatist themes. On account of the intrinsic ambiguities 
of the question we opted for a trichotomized answer where: a) the article dealt mainly 
and exclusively with corporatism and corporatist themes; b) the article dealt with 
corporatism and corporatism themes but shared its focus with other themes; c) the 
article dealt mainly with other issues and corporatism held a fairly secondary role in 




Main Subject Matter is Corporatism? 
Period Yes (a) 
No, but one of 
the main (b) 
No (c) Total 
1971 - 1975 1,8% 2,2% 1,6% 1,9% 
1976 - 1980 14,0% 3,0% 10,5% 7,9% 
1981 - 1985 10,5% 3,7% 8,1% 6,7% 
1986 - 1990 22,8% 14,9% 13,7% 15,9% 
1991 - 1995 15,8% 23,9% 22,6% 21,9% 
1996 - 2000 17,5% 15,7% 21,8% 18,4% 
2001 - 2005 8,8% 17,9% 8,1% 12,4% 
2006 - 2010 8,8% 18,7% 13,7% 14,9% 
Total  18,1% 42,5% 39,4% 100,0% 
Note: N = 315. Data are drawn from the variable Main_focus of the Corporatism Articles 
Data Set 2.  
 
 
The articles classified as c) were only coded for the fields pertaining to basic 
information (year, author, and journal) and not the remainder. The number of 
articles dealing mainly and exclusively with corporatism (a) suffers a significantly 
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smaller variation than the whole sample, albeit usually following the generic trends. 
It is only in the quinquenniums between 1976 and 1990 that number of articles of b) 
where corporatism is sidelined by other themes is smaller than a) the number of 
articles yielding specific and full attention to corporatism. 
Other Subject Matter 
The main subject matter covered is, as one would expect, economic policy followed by 
interest groups and political system/political regime. Taken as an ensemble these 
three themes perform a fair job in describing what corporatism came to be in its 
tripartite shape or version: a political system actively including recognized interest 
groups, selected upon the imperative of stable and economic growth to optimize the 
design and implementation of economic policy. 
 
Table 2 
Subject Matters Covered Beside Corporatism 
Overarching 
Subject Matter 





Political system/regime 24.6 
Quality of democracy 16.2 
Public policy 14.1 
Political transitions 11.5 
Bureaucracy and legal issues 8.4 





Economic policy 32.5 
Economic performance 14.1 
Economic development 6.8 





Interest groups 27.8 
Globalization 5.2 
Political atitudes 4.7 





Social justice 7.3 
State theory 5.8 
 
Note: N= 190. Data are drawn from the variable Other_subject_matters of the Corporatism 
Articles Data Set 2. The total percentage for the % Articles column exceeds 100% because 
articles frequently address more than one subject. 
 
It is also interesting to note how among the themes ascribed to the overarching 
subject matter of conceptual treatment it is pluralism the one getting most of 
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attention. This is most likely due to the conditions under which corporatism re-
entered the vocabulary and conceptual palette of academic discourse than to the 
material reality to which corporatism actually refers. Given the highly complex ideas 
of organicism and the originally catholic principle of subsidiarity13 that concur to the 
conceptualization of corporatism, there was plenty terrain for the construction and 
development of the underlying state theory in corporatism, or even for reflections 
sensitive to the normative grounds upon which corporate systems could promote 
particular visions of social justice and how well they were able to enact such 
desiderata. Instead, because corporatist authors were trespassing empirical terrains 
previously claimed by theorists of pluralism, a dispute arose as to which contender 
could offer greater explanatory leverage. 
Types of Corporatism Dealt With 
The most studied type of corporatism is societal corporatism followed by state 
corporatism and curiously enough, by types or expressions of corporatism 




Types of Corporatism 
Type of Corporatism % Articles 
Societal Corporatism 73.8 
State Corporatism 18.8 
Other 14.1 
Sectoral or meso corporatism 5.2 
Micro-corporatism 3.7 
Professional Corporatism 3.1 
Transnational Corporatism 1.6 
Local Corporatism 1.0 
Note: N = 190. The total percentage for % Articles column exceeds 100% because some 
articles address more than one type of corporatism. Data are drawn from the variable 
Type_corporatism of the Corporatism Articles Data Set 2.  
 
 
These “other” types of corporatism essentially highlight specific possibilities already 
contained in the main concept or characterize with adjectives. Nevertheless, it would 
be inaccurate to classify them as any of the available specified types, especially when 
                                                        
13 Regarded as the neologism of Pope Pius XI, essentially stating “that the lowest unit that can perform a 
particular function adequately, efficiently and with benefit to the whole should do so before a high level 
becomes involved” (Schrems, 2007: 1140). 
 
they have been deliberately baptized and or theorized as a distinct breed or analytical 
category of corporatism. To mention a few, these exceptional types can be: a sort of 
rural corporatism in French
embedded agricultural corporatism (Meadwell, 1991); a latent countryside inherited 
corporatism (Eisenstadt, 2009); a kind of colonial coporatism (Heilbrunn, 1997); an 
ethnic corporatism or quasi
to give an example of a corporatism taken as an analytical category we have the 
inclusionary/exclusionary corporatism to describe the incorporation of labor in 
corporatist institutional settings.
 
Goals of Research 
The numbers of theory generation crest in the
Data Set 1, and then suffer a 93% slump. After this huge decrease the number of 
articles aiming at theory generation rises steadily and slowly. This result seemingly 
concurs with our speculation regarding Data Set 1,
elaboration upon the concept of corporatism and the search and discussion for 
effective and accurate ways to measure it the interest in the concept itself petered out 
and corporatism came to play more of a explanatory role for ot
phenomena. 
Figure 4. Goals of Research 1971
 
Focus on Associations 
With this question we were mainly interested in finding out whether the expected 
predominance of research on tripartite corporatism would show any kind of bias in 
-occupied Vietnamese villages (Gourevitch, 1977); 
-consociationalism (Kopstein & Wittenberg, 2010); and, 
 
 same period as the ones labeled TFC in 
 that after discussion and 





the focus on traditional constituent parts. Furthermore, we wished to enable the 
sample’s responsiveness to shifts in attention to the different parts of a tripartite 
structure. We hence surveyed for the presence of significant quantitative or 
qualitative data, or   data, about structure, features and other aspects of business or 
labor associations presented. Despite the necessarily vague structure of the question 
it provided a useful, albeit blunt, probe for the issue of any empirical bias. 
 Among the articles with an empirical analysis attention towards associations 
concentrates heavier on labor associations with 22,9%. The results are hence 
consistent with Vivien Schmidt’s account of scholarly attention in the area of political 
economy; business associations do receive more attention in the late 1990’s than in 
any other period. There is a surprisingly large amount of articles bearing no 
particular attention to the inner structure or action of either type of associations in 
the period of 1991 to 1995. 
 
Table 4 
Focus on Business and/or Labor Associations 






Note: N=157. Data are drawn from the variables Business_labor from 
the Corporatism Articles Data Set 2. 
 
 
Methods of Empirical Analysis  
The large share of empirical analysis employs qualitative methods — representing 
almost half with 47.4% of the total — while articles using mainly quantitative 
methods constitute a surprisingly small share of the sample. Given the wide variety of 
corporatism indicators one might have expected a more frequent use of them in a 
quantitative fashion. The reason why this is not the case in the sample may be due to 
the exclusion of many articles that did use indicators for the degree of corporatism as 
one of the many explanatory variables but granted an unequivocally secondary role to 





Methods of Empirical Analysis 










Mixed method,  
 dominantly qualitative 
28.2 
Mixed Method, 
 dominantly quantitative 
11.5 
Quantitative 12.8 
Total 100.0  
Note: N=157. Data are drawn from the variables Method_analysis of the Corporatism 
Articles Data Set 2. 
 
 
Geographical Coverage of Empirical Research 
There is an acute, and perhaps expected, imbalance in the geographical coverage of 
corporatism in favor of the Western Europe area. In fact the data shows that analysis 
of the Western European sites is more frequent than the rest of the world combined 
throughout all periods until 1996-2000. Albeit firstly used to describe political 
configurations of the Scandinavian societies the growth in interest led the concept to, 
as Jessop (1990, p. 111) put it, acquire “ever more connotations” in a way that “almost 
all modern societies have, at some point or another, been described as corporatist”. 
  
Table 6 
Geographical Coverage of Empirical Research 
 
                                                Area                   % Articles 
Western Europe 68.6 
North America 16.7 
Latin American 15.4 
East Asia 10.3 
Oceania 9.0 
Middle East and North Africa 5.8 
Eastern Europe 4.5 
USSR or post-Soviet Republics 2.6 
Global 2.6 
South East Asia 1.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 
Other 0.6 
Note: N = 157. Data are drawn from the variable Geographical_coverage of the Corporatism 
Articles Data Set 2. 
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The fact that North America occupies the second position in attention granted can 
hardly be interpreted as a sign of presence of corporatist patterns but rather as 




If we were to take a snapshot at the archetypical article on corporatism, based on 
Data Set 2 results it would look rather indistinct and in a way suiting the hybrid 
nature of most of late actually existing corporatism; a strain of regulatory 
experiments among others. This “model article” would pay significant attention to 
the subject matters of economic policy and, accordingly, it would deal with the 
societal corporatist type. There would be no specific focus in neither business nor 
labor associations which is considerably surprising given its apparent predilection for 
tripartism where the associational structure and functioning would be natural points 
of interest. Data analysis would be mainly qualitative in spite of the reported 
impressive spree of available measures for the concept and its scientific goals would 
be a compromise between theory and empirical description. Its preferred geographic 
locations for inquiry would be in the Western Europe, at least until the mid 1990’s a 
time when this Eurocentric bias is somehow mitigated.   
Overall Data Set 1 is rather useful for a characterization of the general trends 
in scholarly attention. As seen in figure 3, the IMM category has a significant 
different behavior from the remaining. A simple narrative could account for such 
fact: after much debate on the concept of corporatism, how to ascribe it to concrete 
phenomena, and what kind of relationships did these phenomena appeared to bear 
with other meaningful political and economical facts the theme was rendered apt for 
empirical testing; benefiting from increasing sophistication of quantitative methods 
applied to social science, the emphasis shifted from digging and excavating both the 
concept and discrete manifestations to efforts for unveiling general laws governing 
the phenomena. As the concept grew operative through more available data and an 
impressive spree of different indicators of corporatism (for an overview of 42 
indicators of corporatism see Kenworthy, 2000) it was integrated in the array of 
macro-explanatory and control variables for all sorts of explicandum. Hence, the 
IMM’s comparatively lagging high numbers are more suited to be interpreted along 
Kenworthy’s (2000) line that interest in corporatist per se waned in favor of a focus 
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in the effects of corporatism empirical dimensions — with measures on the 
organization of interest groups (Schmitter, 1981), their participation in policy making 
(Lehmbruch, 1984), and, later on, wage setting and wage bargaining arrangements 
(Cameron, 1984; Calmfors and Drifill, 1988) — than the claim that academic 
attention to corporatism did persist albeit in a more quantitative fashion.  
To actually determine whether interest in corporatist per se faded and 
subsequently resurged accompanying shifting material realities Data Set 2 offers a 
much better vantage point. Whereas the sample still managed to capture a significant 
variety of corporatist themes, as can be seen in Table 2, the bias towards societal 
corporatism (the umbrella term for democratic corporatism, neocorporatism, 
tripartite corporatism and others) is undeniable. Despite the presumable propensity 
of the very type, on account of its conceptual amplitude, to gather a larger share of 
attention than the rest of the types, a proto-narrative of the whole concept of 
corporatism in the discipline of political science may be unraveled through this 
quantitative glance at the concept.  
 Instead of knowing many things like the “fox” (Berlin, 1953), a fair share of 
the corporatism literature attempted, like the “hedgehog”, to know one big thing: to 
understand and explain the overall economic performance of nation states as a 
function of the structure and the strategy of labor. Kenworthy’s (2000) survey of 
existing indicators of corporatism tends to confirm this predilection of corporatist 
literature towards labor but as shown in table 3 most of articles sampled present 
significant care of either side of the associational backcloth of tripartite corporatism.  
 The slump shown in figure 4 of articles aiming for theory generation coincides 
with the peak of articles focusing exclusively in corporatism (table 1) and also, in Data 
Set 1, with the crest of articles labeled “Theory, Foundations and Currents of 
Thought” (TFC, fig. 3). The concurrence of these three facts does not by itself 
represent any setback in an ongoing understanding of corporatism neither does it 
necessarily signals the swan song of this particular subject of inquiry. It does 
bespeak, however, something about the nature of academic research and hints 
towards some possibly troublesome questions that cannot be aptly answered here.  
 As it seems to stand out of these facts, when seen together with the evolution 
in the overall presence of corporatism in political studies (fig. 2), the discipline of 
political science could be charged of a sort of a collective whimsical behavior towards 
the concept. Especially if read in the light of Goodin’s (2009) take on the “big-
thingism” in political science, passionately plunging in and out of trends that do not 
matter “as much as some hope and others fear” (p. 31).  
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 Typically corporatism has come to make cameos in the more recent strains of 
political economy literature as some previous evolutionary stage of knowledge (see 
Thelen, 2002). As with any generalization of the sort the shortcomings of the 
literature and the putative imperfections of the concept frequently come together in a 
bulk that obscures the concept’s raison d’être and analytical advantage and richness. 
Besides representing the corporatist literature as a school of thought that never was 
they blank out the variety of approaches to corporatism undertook outside the 
perspective of industrial relations. It is even unclear whether these emaciated 
appearances of corporatist literature are a de facto reference to it or a sheer 
benchmark for the past predominance of labor studies within the political economy 
of business and labor. 
 Objectively what Schmidt depicts as a periodical sway of scholarly attention to 
the state, labor and business takes place within the conceptual framework lay down 
by Schmitter’s neocorporatism and, contrary to what the expression of “bringing 
capital back in” (Swenson, 1991) may suggest neither did corporatist literature kept 
capital away (see Streeck & Schmitter, 1985) nor does the new literature “bring” 
necessarily “capital in”. It does recall attention to the relational aspect of the 
dynamics occurring within and between both the regulatory framework and the social 
and technical division of labor that sustain the capitalist mode of production, with a 
special emphasis on the role of the firm (Hall & Soskice, 2001) or on cross-class 
coalitions (for a brief review see Thelen, 2002). What these two strains of political 
economy may bring “back in” to the analytical limelight are capitalists or employers 
in the sense that Schmidt more felicitously phrased as putting the “firm to the fore”. 
 With hindsight of this constant fluctuation, it would not be cynical to forecast 
an upcoming streak of labor studies or predicting a cry for greater attention to labor’s 
explanatory role. These shifts seem to unwittingly capitalize on past oversights with 
fresh disregards, performing von Beyme’s (1983, p. 191) dictum a propos of neo-
corporatism when stating: “every change of paradigm begins with a new 
exaggeration”. But corporatism may still contain the right elements to avoid this 
pendular analytic movement between different organizational interests if such 
interests continue to be theoretically articulated, as it was under the 
conceptualization of the processes of political exchange (Marin, 1990), indeed the 
very process that is arguably central to understand corporatism as politics (see Bull, 
1992, p. 256). 
 Though corporatism never entirely acquired the status of a “big thing”, — 
neither does it fit the “job requirements” (Goodin, 2009, p. 22-4) nor does it pose any 
clear and unique epistemological claim — it did at some time purchased the status of 
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an “approach” and an “intellectual framework” (Wiarda, 1997, p. 23). Because a 
static, more structurally leaning, depiction of corporatism triumphed, the concept 
grew inoperative apparently constrained by its theoretical imperfections, and as a 
result it could not quite analytically cope with the institutional and industrial 
restructuring that underwent post-Fordism (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Perhaps it is 
this analytical shortsightedness that is the most solid motive for a waning attention to 
the concept (Thelen, 1994).  
 Nevertheless, if used with dexterity corporatism may still be a rather useful 
approach to the political economy and system under any kind of technological, 
industrial, economic, and social paradigms [see Siaroff’s (1999) four-dimensional 
ideal-type]. As long as collective actors and state officials persist as features of the 
political landscape, most likely will political exchange take place and most likely will 
this exchange be conceptualized in terms of public and private interests. In this light 
it is possible to deem plenty of the literature on political economy to be corporatism 




In this article we presented a series of statistical features showing the evolution of the 
corporatism literature(s) over the last forty years. Overall they confirm the general 
accounts typically held regarding the sway of scholarly attention. Apart from the 
diminishing attention that corporatism has received in some of the most relevant 
journals in the field of political science it is worth noting the changing nature of the 
subject under study.  
Though political science strives to account for changes in the political realm it 
is not clear how much it changes itself because of the things it wishes to explain. To 
be sure, our aim was not to present a critical essay on the conditions under which 
knowledge is produced. However, it is nevertheless possible to underline that the 
assessment offered in this article provides new data and analysis that may prove 
rather valuable to such critical undertakings. 
It seems likely that the place of corporatism within the literature of political 
economy and comparative politics will remain stable and will keep on providing 
interesting pretexts and relevant case studies to further strengthening academic 
research. And this is certainly due to the very relevance and keen interest of the 
topics that corporatism is supposed to address.  
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We are currently experiencing difficult times marked by a deep economic and 
financial crisis that threatens the stability of conventional social and political 
systems. In these moments filled with burgeoning appeals to social dialogue and new 
political arrangements, it makes perfect sense to recall the accumulated contributions 
that the literature on corporatism may offer for the explanation of sets of motivations 
determining the functioning of interest groups and the economic advantages 
springing from steadfast social compromises. Besides macroeconomic policy 
palliatives, raising waves of increasing skepticism and discomfort, other possibilities 
arise for solutions regarding the maintenance of social and economic equilibrium in 
the western democratic world. The issues raised by the early corporatist literature are 
certainly outdated, but they still resonate beyond the twentieth century, bequeathing 
us the task of further comprehension. It was precisely with that aim in mind that the 
present assessment has been produced.  
The prolonged character of the current crisis is a safe guarantee of the 
opportunity to discuss the subjects related with the corporative problematic of 
interest representation and the order of collective action. No speculation on the 
possible quantitative vigor or qualitative innovation will amount to any significant 
interest if one crucial point of understanding is delayed or unremarked: the fact that 
a movement that threatened to materialize in an alternative paradigm of social, 
political and economical organization was rather gradually transformed in a stream 
of empirical and theoretical reflection that still holds an outstanding position in the 
research agenda of political science and political economy. 
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Appendix 1: Labeling Criteria 
Note: Only the articles that present the term “corporatism” in the full text of the selected 
reviews were sampled. 
Articles were labeled once. 
For articles covering subjects related to more than one label, the dominant one is to be 
determined according to the description and criteria that follows. 
Perhaps a “Globalization and Corporatism” label would be of interest but then again it would 
be somewhat redundant for most of the articles that would fall into such category come from 
the Studies in Comparative Development Review. 
 
Indicators, Measures and Models (IMM): 
The article pays significant attention to quantitative reasoning. The soundness of data and 
models are of central importance.  
Articles providing new measures or indicators of corporatism are labeled with IMM regardless 
of their scope. 
Articles covering subjects related with RI but with panel data, pooled cross-section or time 
series analyses will be labeled with IMM. 
If the article contains indicators typical of research on corporatism but fails to explicitly 
address them as indicators of corporatism the article will nevertheless be included in the IMM 
category. 
If the article is mainly theoretical but sustains or presents reasoning in algebraic or 
ideographic language it is to be labeled IMM.   
 
Economic Performance (EP): 
Main purpose of the article is to evaluate the role and weight of corporatist institutions in the 
behavior of variables pertaining to economic performance (wage inequality is not to be 
considered as one). 
Articles relating environmental performance with corporatism will be are labeled with EP in 
lack of better fitting.  
Articles referring to corporatism or corporatist institutions in a much too secondary role will 
not be considered. 
 
Theory, Foundations, Current of Thought (TFC): 
The article presents theoretical reasoning, thought-experiments, normative reflection, or 
historical reconstruction of the concept of interest. Articles discussing the compatibility of 
democracy and corporatism; addressing the conceptual roots of corporatism; discussing its 
legitimacy; praising its merits or demerits; or efforts in bridging disciplinary boundaries are 
will be labeled with TFC. 
Articles on state theory granting attention to corporatism institutional settings are will also be 
included. 
Subjects related to other labels may be discussed in the article but attention is primarily given 
to theoretical framing and empirical evidence takes a supporting and reduced role.  
 
Regimes and Institutions (RI): 
The article presents case studies on the interaction between political regime and corporatist 
institutions or case studies of corporatist institutions which include bargaining arrangements 
or wage-setting agreements.  
The units of interest may be individual firms, associations or industries. 
If the article covers a large set of national units in the analysis in an econometric fashion it 
will not be considered in this label but with IMM. 
This label may be further refined with tagged geographical information. 
 
Historical Examples (HE): 
The article refers to a national unit of analysis in Historical time where corporatism was a 
main feature of the political regime covered. 
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Appendix 2: Coding Instructions (adapted from Munck & Snyder, 2007) 
1. Article Identification  
a) Year. Year of publication. 
b) Journal 
(1) Political Studies 
(2) Comparative Political Studies 
(3) Comparative Politics 
c) Title. The first four letters from title of article. 
d) Label. Label given in Data Set 1. 
 
2. Authors 
a) Surname. Surname of first author. 
b) Initial. Initial of the first author. 
c) N_authors. The number of authors contributing to the publication. 
d) Discipline. The discipline of the first author. 
(1) Political Science 
(2) Economics 
(3) Sociology 
(4) International relations 
(5) Undeclared 
(6) Other 
e) Local_affiliation. Location of author’s affiliation. 
(1) EUA, Canada, Australia, e New Zealand 
(2) Western Europe 
(3) Latin America and the Caribbean 
(4) Asia 
(5) Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Republics 




3. Corporatism: Scope and Objectives 
a) Main_focus. The main focus of the article is the concept, manifestations, or 
indicators and measures of corporatism? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No, but one of the main (corporatism shares the central concerns of the article woth 
other subject matters) 
(3) No (corporatism takes a clearly secondary in the structure and scope of the article) 
If (3) skip all remaining fields. 
 
b) Type_corporatism. What type of corporatism is addressed in the article? (if 
necessary select multiple values) 
(1) Societal corporatism 
(2) State corporatism 
(3) Socialist corporatism 
(4) Local corporatism 
(5) Transnational corporatism 
(6) Sectoral corporatism 
(7) Other 
 
c) Other_subject_matters. Besides corporatism the article addresses the topic(s) of (if 
necessary select multiple values, up to three):  
(1) Quality of democracy 
(2) Political Transitions 
(3) Political Regime/ Political System 
(4) Bureaucracy and legal issues 
(5) Public Policy 
(6) Economic performance 
(7) Economic development 
(8) Economic policy 
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(9) State restructuring 
(10) Globalization 
(11) Social Movements 
(12) Interest Groups 
(13) Political attitudes  
(14) Pluralism 
(15) State  
(16) Social Justice 
 
d) Scientific_goal. Is the goal of the article theory generation and/or empirical analysis?  
(1) Theory generation 
(2) Both theory generation and empirical analysis 
(3) Empirical Analysis 
 




4. Empirical Analysis 




b) Business_labor. Is data on business and/or labor associations presented as 
significant  part of the general structure of the article? 
(1) = Business Associations 
(2) = Labor Associations 
(3) = Both 
(4) = None 
 
c) Method_data. What method is used to generate the data?  
(1) = Analysis of secondary sources 
(2) = Analysis of newspapers and sources 
(3) = Analysis of government sources and official documents 
(4) = Interviews 
(5) = Focus Group 
(6) = Surveys and questionnaires 
(7) = Experiment 
(8) = Other 
 
d) N_country. How many countries does the article present in the study? 
1,2,3 … N 
 
e) Geographical _coverage. From what region of the world are the countries included in 
the study? (If necessary select multiple values) 
(1) Western Europe 
(2) Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia) 
(3) USSR or post-Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) 
(4) East Asia (China, Hong-Kong, Japan, Koreas, Taiwan, Tibet) 
(5) South Asia (Bali, Brunei, Burma, Cambodja, East Timor, Indonesia, Malasia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) 
(6) Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) 
(7) Middle Eastern and North Africa  
(8) Sub-Saharan Africa 
(9) Latin America 





f) Time. How many years are covered by the study 
(1) less than a year 
(2) from 1 to 5 years 
(3) from 5 to 20 years 
(4) from 20 to 50 years 
(5) more than 50 years 
 
g) Units_observation. If observations are made on a unit other than the country, what is 
the unit of observation? (If necessary select multiple values and offer corresponding 
N in the following variable) 
(1) Country-time period 
(2) Subnational jurisdiction (state government, regional, village) 
(3) Subnational jurisdiction-time period 
(4) Group or organization (political party, business, trade union) 
(5) Group or organization-time period 
(99) Other 
 
(If none of the above skip next field.) 
 
h) N_observations (when the unit observed is not a country) 
1,2,3 … N 
 
i) Method_analysis. What methods are used to analyze the data? 
(1) Qualitative 
(2) Mixed, mainly qualitative 
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